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Abstract 
We provide elementary and uniform proofs of order independence for 
various strategy elimination procedures for finite strategic games, both 
for dominance by pure and by mixed strategies. The proofs follow the 
same pattern and focus on the structural properties of the dominance 
relations. They rely on Newman's Lemma (see Newman [1942]) and 
related results on the abstract reduction systems. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Preliminaries 
To properly discuss the background for this research we need to recall a number 
of concepts commonly used in the study of strategic games. We follow here a 
standard terminology of the game theory, see, e.g., Myerson [1991] or Osborne 
and Rubinstein [1994]. We stress the fact that we deal here only with finite 
games. Given n players we represent a strategic game by a sequence 
where for each i E [Ln] 
• Si is the finite, non-empty, set of strategies (sometimes called pure 
strategies) available to player i, 
• Pi is the payoff function for the player i, so 
Pi : S1 x ... x Sn--+ 'R, 
where 'R is the set of real numbers. 
We assume that Si n Sj = 0 for i =/= j. 
Given a sequence of non-empty sets of strategics S 1, ... , Sn and s E S1 x 
... x Sn we denote the ith element of s by si and use the following standard 
notation: 
• (s~, s_i) := (s1, ... , si-1, s~, si+1, ... , sn), where we assume that s~ E Si· 
In particular (si, s_i) = s, 
• S_i := S1 x ... x S\_1 x Si+1 x ... x Sn, 
We denote the strategics of player i by Si, possibly with some superscripts. 
Next, given a game G := (S1, ... , Sn, p 1, .. . ,pn) and non-empty sets of 
strategies Si, S~, .. . , S~, S~ such that S~ ~Si and S~' ~Si for i E [Ln] we 
say that G' := (Si, ... ,S~,p1,---,Pn) and G" := (S~, ... ,S~,p1, ... ,pn) are re-
strictions 1 of G and denote by G' n G" the restriction (Si n S~, ... , S~ n 
1Sometimes the name reduction is used. In Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990] a restriction 
is called a subgame. 
S~, p1, ... , Pn). In each case we identify each payoff function Pi with its restric-
tion to the Cartesian product of the new strategy sets. 
Fix a game (81 , ... , Sn, Pi, .. . ,pn)· We now introduce a number of well-
known binary dominance relations on strategies. We say that a strategy Si is 
weakly (strictly) dominated by a strategy s~, or equivalently, a strategy s~ 
weakly (strictly) dominates a strategy si, if 
for all s_i E S_i, with some inequality (all inequalities) being strict. We denote 
the weak dominance relation by W and the strict dominance relation by S. 
Further, we say that the strategies si and s~ of player i are compatible if 
for all j E (l..n] and s_i E S_i 
We then say that si is nicely weakly dominated by s~ if si is weakly dom-
inated bys~ and Si and s~ are compatible. This notion of dominance, that we 
denote by NW, was introduced in Marx and Swinkels [1997]. 
Finally, recall that two strategics Si and s~ of player i are called payoff 
equivalent if 
Pi(si, s_i) = Pi(s~, s_i) 
for all j E [1..n] and all s_i E S-i· We denote this binary relation on the 
strategies by PE. 
These notions have natural counterparts for mixed strategies that will be 
introduced later in the paper. 
Each binary dominance relation R, so in particular W, S, NW or PE, in-
duces the following binary relation on strategic games G := (81, ... , Sn, P1, ... , Pn) 
and G' := (S~, .. . , S~,p1, ... ,pn): 
G;:;:} R G' iff G f G' and for all i E [Ln] each Si E Si \ s~ is 
R-dominated in G by some s~ E s;. 
If all iterations of ;:;:} R starting in an initial game G yield the same final 
outcome, we say that R is order independent. 
1.2 Background 
In the literature on dominance relations in finite strategic games several order 
independence results were established, to wit: 
• Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990] and Stegeman [1990] proved it for strict 
dominance by pure strategies, 
• Borgers [1990,1993] established it for his notion of (unary) dominance, 
• Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] proved it for strict dominance by mixed 
strategies, 
• Marx and Swinkels [1997,2000]) proved it for nice weak dominance up to 
the addition or removal of the payoff equivalent strategies and a renaming 
of strategics. 
This implies the same form of order independence for weak dominance by 
pure strategies for the games (51 , ... , Sn,p1, ..• ,pn) satisfying the follow-
ing transference of decisionmaker indifference (TDI) condition: 
for all i, j E [Ln], ri, ti E Si and s_i E S_i 
Pi(ri, s_i) = Pi(ti, s_i) implies Pi(ri, s-i) = Pi(ti, s_i)-
Informally, this condition states that whenever for player i two of its 
strategics ri and ti are indifferent w.r.t. some joint strategy s_i of the 
other players, then ri and ti are also indifferent w.r.t. s_i for all players. 
They also established analogous results for nice weak dominance and 
weak dominance by mixed strategies. 
These results were established by different methods and techniques. In 
particular, the proof of order independence given in Borgers [1990] proceeds 
through a connection between the rationalizability notion of Pearce [1984] and 
the survival of a strategy under the iterated dominance. In turn, the original 
proof of order independence for strict dominance by mixed strategics given in 
Osborne and Rubinstein [1994, pages 61-62] involves in an analogous way a 
modification of the rationalizability notion and relies on the existence of Nash 
equilibrium for strictly competitive games. 
It is useful to point out that the assumption that the games are finite 
is crucial. In fact, in an interesting paper Dufwenberg and Stegeman [2002] 
showed that in case of infinite games order independence for strict dominance 
does not hold. They also provided natural conditions under which the unique 
outcome is guaranteed. 
1.3 Motivation 
In this paper we provide uniform and elementary proofs of the abovementioned 
and related order independence results. The table in Figure 1 should clarify the 
scope of the paper. So we deal both with unary and binary dominance relations 
and with pure and mixed strategies. While binary dominance relations, such 
as the ones introduced in the previous subsection, are more known, the unary 
ones, introduced in Borgers [1990,1993], allow us to characterize a specific form 
of the rational strategics. 
I dominance \ strategies I pure I mixed I 
l~~n:~ I I I 
Figure 1: Classification of the order independence results 
Further, we also consider combinations of binary dominance relations, both 
for pure and for mixed strategics. 
Having in mind such a plethora of possibilities it is difficult to expect a 
single 'master result' that would imply all the discussed order independence 
results. Still, as we show, it is possible to provide uniform proofs of these 
results based on the same principles. Notably, our presentation focuses on 
so-called abstract reduction systems (see, e.g., Terese [2003]) in particular on 
Newman's Lemma (see Newman [1942]) and some of its natural refinements. 
Newman's Lemma offers a simple but highly effective and versatile tool 
for proving order independence results. We discuss it and its consequences in 
detail in the next section and later, in Section 7. Let us just mention here 
that it deals with the properties of a binary relation ~ on an arbitrary set 
A. Below ~ * denotes the transitive reflexive closure of ~ . We say that ~ 
is weakly confluent if for all a, b, c E A 
implies that for some d E A 
a 
/ ""' b c 
b c 
""'* * / d 
Then Newman's lemma simply states that whenever 
• no infinite -+ sequences exist, 
• -+ is weakly confluent, 
then for each element a E A all -+ sequences starting in a have a unique 'end 
outcome'. 
It turns out that to prove order independence of a (binary or unary) dom-
inance relation R it suffices to establish weak confluence of the corresponding 
reduction relation =';> R and apply Newman's lemma. In fact, since only finite 
games are considered, no infinite =';> R sequences exist. 
To deal with combinations of two dominance relations, in particular the 
combination of nice weak dominance NW and payoff equivalence PE, a rela-
tivized version of Newman's lemma is helpful, where one only claims unique 
'end outcome' up to an equivalence relation. In the game-theoretic setting 
this equivalence relation is an 'equivalence up to strategy renaming' relation 
on strategic games. 
Further, the following notion involving a relative dependence between two 
binary relations -+ 1 and -+ 2 on some set A turns out to be useful. We say 
that -+1 left commutes with -+2 if 
~l 0 ~2 ~ --72 ° --1-i ' 
i.e., if for all a, b, c E A a -+1 b-+2 c implies that for some d EA a -+2 d -+i c. 
Now, one can prove that ='i>PE left commutes with ='i>NW· This allows us 
to 'push' the removal of the payoff equivalent strategies to the 'end' and prove 
a 'structured' form of the order independence of NW combined with PE, a 
result originally established in Marx and Swinkels [1997]. 
Our presentation is also influenced by Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990] where 
order independence for strict dominance was proved by establishing this result 
first for arbitrary (binary) dominance relations that are strict partial orders 
and hereditary. 
In our approach we isolate other useful properties of dominance relations, 
both for the case of pure and mixed strategies. In particular, we identify 
conditions that allow us to conclude order independence up to a renaming 
of strategics for a combination of two reduction relations. This allows us to 
identify the relevant properties of nice weak dominance that lead to the results 
of Marx and Swinkels [1997]. 
Of course, each strategy elimination procedure needs to be motivated, ei-
ther by clarifying the reasoning used by the players or by clarifying its effect 
on the structure of the game, for example on its set of Nash equilibria. In our 
exposition we ignore these issues since we focus on the dominance relations 
and the entailed elimination procedures that were introduced and motivated 
in the cited references. 
1.4 Organization of the paper 
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we discuss Newman's 
lemma. Then in Section 3, following Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990], we set the 
stage by discussing (binary) dominance relations for strategic games and their 
natural properties, in particular hereditarity. Intuitively, a dominance relation 
is hereditary if it is inherited from a game to any restriction. Some domi-
nance relations are hereditary, while others not. Usually, for non-hereditary 
dominance relations order independence does not hold. 
Then, in Section 4, we generalize the approach of Borgers [1990,1993] to 
deal with arbitrary non-hereditary dominance relations. Informally, each such 
binary dominance relation R can be modified to a unary dominance relation 
for which under some natural assumption both entailed reduction relations 
--+inh-R and ::::}inh-R are order independent. 
Next, in Section 5 we study dominance relations where the dominating 
strategies are mixed. We mimic here the development of Section 3 by identify-
ing natural properties and establishing a general result on order independence. 
We apply then these results to show order independence for strict dominance 
by mixed strategies. In Section 6 we generalize the approach of Section 4 to 
the case when the dominating strategies are mixed. 
To prepare the ground for results involving game equivalence we discuss in 
Section 7 a modification of Newman's Lemma in presence of an equivalence 
relation. Then in Section 8 we resume the discussion of dominance relations 
by focusing on the payoff equivalence. For this dominance relation order inde-
pendence does not hold, but order independence up to a renaming of strategies 
does hold. Analogous results hold in case of equivalence to a mixed strategy 
and are discussed in Section 9. 
Then in Section 10 we study conditions under which order dominance up to 
a renaming of strategies can be proved for a combination of two dominance re-
lations. Such a combination is useful to study when one of these two relations 
is not hereditary. Then in Section 11 we apply the obtained general result 
to get a simple and informative proof of a result of Marx and Swinkels [1997] 
that nice weak dominance is order independent up to the removal of the payoff 
equivalent strategies and a renaming of strategies. In the next two Sections, 
12 and 13, we mimic these developments for the case of equivalence to and 
dominance by a mixed strategy. Finally, in the concluding section we summa-
rize the results in a tabular form and explain why each of the discussed order 
independence results has to be established separately. 
2 Abstract Reduction Systems 
We provide first completely general results concerning abstract reduction sys-
tems. An abstract reduction system, see, e.g., Huet [1980], (and Terese 
[2003] for a more recent account, where a slightly different terminology is used) 
is a pair (A, -+) where A is a set and -+ is a binary relation (a reduction) 
on A. Let -++ denote the transitive closure of -+ and -+* the transitive 
reflexive closure of -+. So in particular, if a= b, then a-+* b. Further, a -+fb 
means a = b or a -+ b. 
• We say that bis a -+-normal form of a if a-+* band no c exists such 
that b -+ c, and omit the reference to -+ if it is clear from the context. 
If every element of A has a unique normal form, we say that (A, -+ ) 
(or just -+ if A is clear from the context) satisfies the unique normal 
form property. 2 
• We say that -+ is weakly confluent if for all a, b, c E A 
implies that for some d EA 
a 
/ ""' b c 
b c 
""'* * / d 
• Following Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990] we say that -+ is one step 
closed if for all a E A some a' E A exists such that 
2We stress the fact that this notion of a normal form, standard in the theory of abstract 
reduction systems, has no relation whatsoever to the notion of a game in normal form, 
another name used for strategic games. In particular, the reader should bear in mind that 
later we shall consider strategic games that are normal forms of specific reduction relations 
on strategic games. 
if a---"* b, then b--*ea'. 
In all proofs of weak confluence given in the paper we shall actually estab-
lish that for some d E A we have b --*Ed and c --*ed. 
In the sequel, as already mentioned, we shall repeatedly rely upon the 
following lemma established in Newman [1942]. 
Lemma 2.1 (Newman) Consider an abstract reduction system (A, ---"*)such 
that 
• no infinite ---"* sequences exist, 
• ---"* is weakly confluent. 
Then ---"* satisfies the unique normal form property. 
Proof. (Taken from Terese [2003, page 15].) 
By the first assumption every element of A has a normal form. To prove 
uniqueness, call an element a ambiguous if it has at least two different normal 
forms. We show that for every ambiguous a some ambiguous b exists such that 
a ---+ b. This proves absence of ambiguous elements by the first assumption. 
So suppose that some element a has two distinct normal forms ni and n2. 
Then for some b, c we have a---"* b ---+* n 1 and a---+ c ---"** n2 . By weak confluence 
some d exists such that b--** d and c ---+*d. Let n3 be a normal form of d. It 
is also a normal form of band of c. Moreover n3 i= n1 or n3 i= n2· If ns i= ni, 
then b is ambiguous and a ---"* b. And if n3 i= n2, then c is ambiguous and 
a--+~ D 
Note that if ---"* is not irreflexive, then the first condition is violated. So 
this lemma can be applicable only to the relations ---+ that are irreflexive. 
All reduction relations on games here considered are by definition irreflexive. 
Moreover, because the games are assumed to be finite, these reduction relations 
automatically satisfy the first condition of Newman's lemma. 
Also, the following simple observation will be helpful. 
Note 2.2 (Unique Normal Form) Consider two abstract reduction systems 
(A, --*I) and (A, --*2 ) such that 
• --*I satisfies the unique normal form property, 
Then ~2 satisfies the unique normal form property. D 
In the remainder of the paper we shall study abstract reduction systems 
that consist of the set of all restrictions of a game and a reduction relation 
on them. Since we limit ourselves to finite games, in such abstract reduction 
systems (A, ~) no infinite ~ sequences exist. 
In this context there are three natural ways of establishing that (A, ~ ) 
satisfies the unique normal form property: 
• by showing that ~ is one step closed: this directly implies weak con-
fluence, and then Newman's Lemma can be applied; 
• by showing that ~ is weakly confluent and applying Newman's Lemma; 
• by finding a 'more elementary' reduction relation ~1 such that 
- no infinite ~1 sequences exist, 
~1 is weakly confluent, 
- ~t = ~+, 
and applying Newman's Lemma and the Unique Normal Form Note 2.2. 
For some reduction relations all three results are equally easy to establish, 
while for some others only one. 
3 Dominance Relations 
We now study (binary) dominance relations in full generality. A dominance 
relation is a function that assigns to each game G := (S1, ... , Sn, Pb ... ,pn) 
a subset Ra of U7=1(Si x Si)· Instead of writing that si Ras~ holds we write 
that Si R s~ holds for G. We say then that si is R-dominated bys~ in G 
or that that s~ R-dominates si in G. When G is clear from the context we 
drop a reference to it and view a dominance relation as a binary relation on 
the strategies of G. 
Given a dominance relation R we introduce two notions of reduction be-
tween a game G :=(Si, ... , Sn,P1, ... ,pn) and its restriction G' := (S~, .. . , S~, 
P1, · · .,pn)· 
• We write G ~ R G' when G f G' and for all i E [1..n] 
each Si E Si \ S~ is R-dominated in G by some s~ E Si· 
• We write G =>R G' when G-=!= G' and for all i E [Ln] 
each si E Si\ S~ is R-dominated in G by some s~ E SI. 
So the relations -+ R and =? R differ in just one symbol (spot the difference). 
Namely, in the case of -+ R we require that each strategy removed from Si is 
R-dominatcd in G by a strategy in Si, while in case of => R we require that 
each strategy removed from Si is R-dominated in G by a strategy in S~. So 
in the latter case the dominating strategy should not be removed at the same 
time. 
In the literature both reduction relations were considered. In our subse-
quent presentation we shall focus on the second one, => R, since 
• for most of the reduction relations studied here -+ R and =? R coincide, 
• for payoff equivalence these relations do not coincide and only the second 
reduction relation is meaningful. 
On the other hand, the first reduction relation, -+ R, allows us to define 
the 'maximal' elimination strategy according to which in each round all R-
dominatcd strategics are deleted. Such a natural strategy is in particular of 
interest when order independence fails, see, e.g., Gilli [2002]. 
Further, note when G-+RG', the game G' can be 'degenerated' in the 
sense that some of the strategy sets of G' can be empty. However, this cannot 
happen when -+R and =>R coincide, since then G =>R G' implies that G' is 
not 'degenerated'. 
Finally, let us mention that for various type of dominance relations R 
( unary or binary, for pure and mixed strategies) studied here the equivalence 
between the corresponding -+R and =>n reduction relations plays a crucial 
role in the proofs of the order independence results. 
So each reduction relation has some advantages and it is natural to intro-
duce both of them. 
Recall that a strict partial order is an irreflexive transitive relation. We say 
now that a dominance relation R is a strict partial order if for each game 
G the binary relation Ra is a strict partial order and reuse in a similar way 
other typical properties of binary relations. The following observation clarifies 
the first item above and will be needed later. 
Lemma 3.1 (Equivalence) If a dominance relation R is a strict partial or-
der, then the relations -+ R and =? R coincide. 
Proof. It suffices to show that if G --+ R G', then G =? R G'. 
Let G := (S1, .. . , Sn,P1, ... ,pn) and G' :=(Si, ... , S~,pi, ... ,pn). Suppose 
that some Si E Si\ S~ is R-dominated in G by some s~ E Si· Since R is a 
strict partial order and Si is finite, a strategy s~ E Si exists that R-dominates 
si in G and is not R-dominated in G. So this s~ is not eliminated in the step 
G --+ R G' and consequently si is R-dominated in G by some s~ E s:. D 
In what follows we establish a general 'order independence' result for the 
reduction relation =? R for the dominance relations R that are strict partial 
orders and satisfy the following natural assumption due to Gilboa, Kalai and 
Zemel [1990]. We say that a dominance relation R is hereditary if for every 
game G, its restriction G' and two strategies Si and s~ of G' 
si is R-dominated by s~ in G implies Si is R-dominated by s~ in G'. 
Each reduction relation =? R can be specialized by stipulating that a single 
strategy is removed. We denote the corresponding reduction relation by =?1,R. 
A natural question when the reduction relation =? R can be modeled using the 
iterated application of the =?-1,R reduction relation does not turn out to be 
interesting. 
In fact, for most dominance relations that are of importance such a model-
ing is not possible. The reason is that when removing strategies in an iterated 
fashion, in particular in the one-at-a-time fashion, some previously undomi-
nated strategies can become eligible for removal. So this process can yield a 
different outcome than a single removal of several strategies. 
In contrast, the following definition seems to capture a relevant property. 
We say that that a reduction relation =?-R satisfies the one-at-a-time prop-
erty if 
___.._+ - __._+ 
-,.-1,R - __,-R· 
Obviously, if =*i.R = =?~, then also =?i,R = =?n. The following result 
clarifies when the one-at-a-time property holds. 
Theorem 3.2 (One-at-a-time Elimination) For a dominance relation R 
that is hereditary the °*R relation satisfies the one-at-a-time property. 
Proof. Note that always =?-1,R ~ =?-R, so =?-i,R ~ =?i?_ always holds. 
To prove the inverse inclusion it suffices to show that =? R ~ =?t R· So 
suppose that G =?-R G'. We prove that G =?i R G' by induction on the n~mber 
k of strategies deleted in the transition from G to G'. If k = 1, then G =?1,R G' 
holds. 
Suppose now that claim holds for some k > 1. Assume that G := (Si, ... , Sn, 
pi, ... ,pn) and G' := (Sf, ... , S~,p1, ... ,pn)· For each i E [Ln) let Si\ s: := { tt, .. . , t:i }. So for all i E [1..n] and all j E [Lki] the strategy t{ is R-
dominated in G by some s{ E s:. Choose some strategy t{~ and let G" be the 
game resulting from G by removing t{~ from Sio. Then G ==h,R G". 
Since t{~ ~ Uf=1 s: each strategy s{ is in G". So by the hereditarity of R each 
strategy t{, where (i,j) =I (i0,j0), is R-dominated in G" bys{. This means 
that G" => R G'. By the induction hypothesis G" =>t,R G', hence G =>t,R G'. D 
Now, given a dominance relation R that is hereditary and is a strict par-
tial order we can establish that the => R reduction relation on the set of all 
restrictions of a game H satisfies the unique normal form property (in short: 
is UN) in one of the following three ways: 
• by showing that => R is one step closed; this is the argument provided 
by Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990], 
• by proving that =>R is weakly confluent, 
• by proving that =>i,R is weakly confluent. 
In the last case one actually proceeds by showing that =>i,R satisfies the 
diamond property, where we say that - satisfies the diamond property if 
for all a, b, c E A such that b "I- c 
implies that for some d E A 
a 
/ ""' b c 
b c 
""' / d 
All three proofs are straightforward. As an illustration we provide the proof 
for the second approach as its pattern will be repeated a number of times. 
Lemma 3.3 (Weak Confluence) Consider a dominance relation R that is 
hereditary and is a strict partial order. Then the =>R relation on the set of all 
restrictions of a game H is weakly confluent. 
Proof. Suppose 
We prove that then 
G 
~ R~ 
G' G" 
G' G" 
R~E €~ 
G' n G" 
Recall that a =?kb means a =?Rb or a= b. 
If G' is a restriction of G' n G", then G' = G' n G" and consequently 
G' *k G' n G". Otherwise suppose 
G' := (S~, .. . , S~,P1, ... ,pn), 
G" (S" S" ) := 1 > • • ., n,P1, · · .,pn · 
Then 
G' n G" = (S~ n s~, .. . , s~ n s~, P1, .. . , Pn)· 
Fix i E [1..n] and consider a strategy Si E s~ such that Si rt. s~ n sr. So Si is 
eliminated in the step G =? R G". Hence some s~ E Si R-dominates Si in G. 
Case 1. s~ E sr 
G' is a restriction of G and R is hereditary so s~ also R-dominates Si in G'. 
Case 2. s~ rt. sr 
So s~ is eliminated in the step G =? R G'. Hence a strategy s7 E Si exists 
that R-dominates s~ in G. By the transitivity of R, s7 R-dominates Si in G 
and hence, by hereditarity, in G'. 
This proves G' -+n G' n G" and hence, by the Equivalence Lemma 3.1, 
G' =?n G' n G". 
By symmetry G" *k G' n G". o 
This brings us to the following result of Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990]. 
Theorem 3.4 (Elimination) For a dominance relation R that is hereditary 
and a strict partial order the =? R relation is UN. D 
To illustrate a direct use of the above results consider the strict dominance 
relation S. It entails the reduction relation =9-s on games obtained by in-
stantiating R in ==?- R by the strict dominance relation. As already noted by 
Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990] strict dominance is clearly hereditary and is a 
strict partial order. So we get the following conclusion. 
Theorem 3.5 (Strict Elimination) 
(i) The ==?-s relation is UN. 
(ii) The =9-s relation satisfies the one-at-a-time property. D 
In other words, the process of iterated elimination of strictly dominated 
strategies yields a unique outcome and coincides with the outcome of the 
iterated elimination of a single dominated strategy. 
4 Pure Strategies: Inherent Dominance 
In this section we introduce and study a natural generalization of the binary 
dominance notion, due to Borgers [1990,1993]. Consider a game (S1, ... , Sn, 
p 1, ... ,pn)· Let R be a dominance relation and §_i a non-empty subset of 
s-i· We say that a strategy Si is R-dominated given §_i by a strategy s~ 
if si is R-dominated by s~ in the game (Si, B-i,PI, .. . , Pn)· Then we say t~at 
a strategy si is inherently R-dominated if for every non-empty subset S_i 
of S_i it is R-dominatcd given S_i by some strategy s~. So we turned in this 
way the binary relation R to a unary relation on the strategies. 
Note that in the definition of inherent R-dominance for each subset S_i of 
S_i a different strategy of player i can R-dominate the considered strategy si· 
This can make this notion of dominance stronger than R-dominancc. Borgers 
[1990,1993] studied this notion of dominance for R being weak dominance and 
established for it the order independence. The resulting dominance relation, 
inherent weak dominance, is an intermediate notion between strict and weak 
dominance. Indeed, it is clearly implied by strict dominance and implies in 
turn weak dominance. The converse implications do not hold as the following 
two examples show. In the game 
T 
M 
B 
L R 
2 -
' 
1 -
' 1 -
' 
2 -
' 1 -
' 
3 -
' 
the strategy M is weakly dominated by T given { L} and weakly dominated 
by B given {R} or given {L, R}. So Mis inherently weakly dominated but is 
not strictly dominated by any strategy. 
In turn in the game 
L R 
1,-
1,-
the strategy B is not inherently weakly dominated but is weakly dominated. 
It is well-known that weak dominance is not order independent. We shall 
return to this matter in Section 11. The intuitive reason is that weak domi-
nance is not hereditary. As a consequence the proof of the corresponding weak 
confluence property does not go through. 
The notion of inherent R-dominance does not fit into the framework devel-
oped in Section 3, since it is a unary relation. However, when studying reduc-
tion by means of it we can proceed in a largely analogous fashion. So first we 
introduce two notions of reduction between a game G := ( S1, ... , Sn, P1, ... , Pn) 
and its restriction G' := (SL ... , s~,p1 , .•. ,pn), this time involving the inherent 
R-dominance notion. 
• We write G -"inh-R G' when G-:/= G' and for all i E [l..n] 
each Si E Si \ s~ is inherently R-dominated in G. 
• We write G =*inh-R G' when G -:/= G' and for all i E [l..n] for every 
non-empty subset s_i of s_i 
each Si E Si\ s~ is R-dominated in G given [;_i by some s~ E sr 
So in the -"inh-R relation for every non-empty subset s_i of s_i we require 
R-dominance in G given S_i by some s~ E Si, while in the =*inh-R relation for 
every non-empty subset §_i of S_i we require R-dominance in G given S_i by 
some s~ E S~. Borgers [1990,1993] considered the first relation, -"inh-R, for R 
being weak dominance. We introduce the second one, =*inh-R , to streamline 
the presentation. As in Section 3 under a natural assumption both notions 
turn out to be equivalent. 
Lemma 4.1 (Equivalence) For a dominance relation R that is a strict par-
tial order the relations -"inh-R and =*inh-R coincide. 
Proof. The proof is similar to that of the Equivalence Lemma 3.1. It suffices 
to show that if G -+inh-R G', then G *inh-R G'. 
Let G := (S1, ... ,Sn,P1, ... ,pn) and G' := (S~, ... ,S~,P1,---,Pn)· Suppose 
that some Si E Si \ s~ is inherently R-dominated in G. Let s_i be a non-
empty subset of s-i· Some strategy s~ E Si R-dominates Si in G given s-i· 
R is a strict partial order and Si is finite, so a strategy s~ E Si exists that 
R-dominates Si in G given [Li and is not R-dominated in G given s_i by 
any strategy in Si. So this s~ is not eliminated in the step G -+inh-R G' and 
consequently Si is R-dominatcd in G given s_i by some s~ E s:. 0 
The following simple observation relates the *inh-R reduction relation to 
the previously introduced relation * R· 
Note 4.2 (Comparison) Consider a dominance relation R. Then 
(i) *inh-R S: * R· 
(ii) If R is hereditary, then the relations *inh-R and *R coincide. 0 
So for hereditary dominance relations no new reduction relations were in-
troduced here. Further, it is easy to provide examples of a non-hereditary R, 
for instance weak dominance, for which the reduction relations *inh-R and 
*R differ. 
We now establish order independence for specific *inh-R reduction rela-
tions. Following Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990] we say that a dominance rela-
tion R satisfies the individual independence of irrelevant alternatives 
condition (in short, IIIA) if for every game (Si, S_i, p1, .. . ,pn) the following 
holds: 
for all i E [Ln], all non-empty s: s;:; Si and si, s~ E S.f 
Si R s~ holds in (Si, s_i,Pl, ... ,pn) iff it holds in (s:, s_i,Pl, ... ,pn)-
IIIA is a very reasonable condition. All specific dominance relations con-
sidered in this paper satisfy it. 
Lemma 4.3 (Weak Confluence) For a dominance relation R that satisfies 
the IIIA condition and is a strict partial order the *inh-R relation on the set 
of all restrictions of a game H is weakly confluent. 
Proof. We proceed as in the proof of the Weak Confluence Lemma 3.3. Sup-
pose G *inh-R G' and G *inh-R G". We prove that then G' * iEnh-R G' n G" 
and G" * ' G' n G" inh-R · 
Sos', is G =;:. '"·h-H 
that R-dominates 8~ in G g~ven f;__i· By the 
:._9, R s: holds in the game 
s_, iu 
s, in G 8_ 1 and since R satisfies the IHA ~v···~·'"'J ... 
s 9 is R-dominatt-d 
we sho\Vfxi that each strategy s 1 
from G' to is inherently R-dominatf'd in 
aud hence. the E{1uivalence Lemma 4.1 
By s.vmnwtry => :nh- R n G". 
can now draw desired 
Theorem 4.4 (Inherent Elimination) 
T"V L/:.'V~ 
IJJA nmdztion 1md is a strict 
i eliminated in the trarrnition 
. This proves G' -+inh--RG'n 
=>mn u G' n G". 
D 
l''fo•vman 's Lemma 2.1. 
a dominance R that sat-
onfrr => inh.- H relation is 
D 
As in Section 3 we introduce the n n'tiuetion rl'lation that removes 
exactly one strategy. as before we say that =>u;h-R satisfies the one-at-
a-time property when 
The 
thcu holds. 
the One-at-a-time Elimination Theorem ;t2 
Theorem 4.5 (One-at-a-time Elimination) For a R 
the the rdatum, =>inh-· l? satisfies thr: one-at-a-
Proof. Analogous to the proof of the Orw-at-a-time Elimination Theorem 3.2 
and omitted. 0 
Since the weak dominance relation W satisfies the IIIA condition and is a 
strict partial order, by the above results we get the following counterpart of 
the Strict Elimination Theorem 3.5. 
Theorem 4.6 {Inherent Weak Elimination) 
(i) The =}inh-W relation is UN. 
(ii) The =}inh-W relation satisfies the one-at-a-time property. D 
The first item was established in Borgers [1990]. In Borgers [1993] it was 
shown that a strategy is inherently weakly dominated iff it is not rational, in 
the sense that it is not a best response to a belief formed over the pure strate-
gies of other players when their payoff functions are not known - it is only 
assumed that their payoff functions are compatible with their publicly known 
preferences. So the =}inh-W relation allows us to model iterated removal of 
strategies that are not rational in this sense. 
5 Mixed Dominance Relations 
The notion of dominance studied in Section 3 involved two pure strategies. 
In this section we study the dominance relations in which the dominating 
strategies are mixed and develop the appropriate general results. 
Let us recall first the definitions. Given a set of strategies Si available to 
player i, by a mixed strategy we mean a probability distribution over Si and 
denote this set of mixed strategies by Mi. 
Given a mixed strategy mi we define 
Consider a game (Si, ... , Sn,P1, ... ,pn)- Each payoff function Pi is gener-
alized to a function 
Pi : M1 x .. - x Mn --t 7l 
by putting for a sequence ( m1, ... , mn) of mixed strategics from M1 x ... x Mn 
Pi(mi, .. . , mn) := L m1(s1). - . mn(sn) Pi(s). 
sES 
As usual, we identify a mixed strategy for player i of a restriction G' of G 
with a mixed strategy of G by assigning the probability 0 to the strategies of 
player i that are present in G but not in G'. Further, we can view a mixed 
strategy for player i in G as a mixed strategy in G' if its support is a subset 
of the set of all strategies of player i in G'. Also, we can identify each pure 
strategy Si with the mixed strategy that assigns to si the probability 1. 
A mized dominance relation is a function that assigns to each game 
G := (S1, ... ,Sn.Ph···1Pn) a subset% of u~=l(S, x M,). When Si% m~ 
holds we say that s, Rm~ holds for G and also say that s, is R-dominated 
by m~ in G, or that m~ R-dominates si in G. 
As in Section 3 we introduce now two notions of reduction between a game 
G := (Si, ... ,S,,,pi, ... ,pn) and its restriction G' .- (S~, ... ,S~,p1, .. .,p11 ), 
this time involving a mixed dominance relation R. 
• We write G-+RG' when G i= G' and for all i E [1..n] 
each s; ES;\ s: is R-dominatt'<i in G by some m~ E Mi. 
• We write G =>R G' when G i= G' and for all i E [1..n] 
each s; ES;\ s: is R-dominated in G by some m~ E MI. 
So, as before, the difference between the -+ R and => R lies in the require-
ment we put on the R-dominating -this time mixed- strategy. In -+ R we 
require that each strategy removed from Si is R-dominated in G by a mixed 
strategy in Mi, while in =?B we require that it is R-dominated in G by a 
mixed strategy in MI- So in the latter case no strategy from the support of 
the R-dominating mixed strategy should be removed at the same time. 
To establish equivalence between both reduction relations we need a coun-
terpart of the notion of a strict partial order. Below, we occasionally write 
each mixed strategy m' over the set of strategics S; as the sum 'EtES; Pt t, where 
each Pt= m'(t). Then given two mixed strategies m 1 , m2 and a strategy ti we 
mean by m 2 [ti/m1] the mixed strategy obtained from m2 by substituting the 
strategy t 1 by m 1 and by 'normalizing' the resulting sum. 
We now say that a mixt.'Cl dominance relation R is regular if in every game 
• for all a E (0, l], s R (1 - a)s +am implies s Rm, 
• t 1 R rn1 and t2 R m2 implies t1 R mi[t2/m2]. 
Lemma 5.1 (Equivalence) For a mixed dominance relation R that is regu-
lar the relations -+ R and => R coincide. 
Proof. We only need to show that G __, R G' implies G ::::? R G'. 
Let G := (81, ... , Sn, P1, .. . ,pn) and G' := (S~, .. . , S~,P1, ... ,pn)- Take 
some s~ E Si\ s~. Let Si\ SI := { t1, ... , tk} with tk = s~. By definition for 
all j E [1..n] some mi E Mi exists such that tj R mi (holds in G). We prove 
by complete induction that in fact for all j E [1..k] some mj E Mi exists such 
that ti R mj and S'Upport(mj) n {t1, ... , ti} = 0. 
For some a E (0, 1] and a mixed strategy m~ with t 1 tJ. support(m~) we 
have 
m1 = (1- a)t1 +am~. 
Since R is regular, t 1 R m1 implies t 1 R m~, which proves the claim for k = 1. 
Assume now the claim holds for all£ E [1..j]. We have tj+1 R mi+l· As in 
the case of k = 1 a mixed strategy m'J+1 exists such that tj+1 tJ. support(m'J+1) 
and ti+l R m'J+1. Let 
mj+1 := m'J+dti/m~] ... [ti/mj]. 
Then for all£ E [1..j] we have support(mj+1 [ti/m~] .. . [te/mmn{t1, ... , tc, tj+1} = 
0, so support(m}+1 ) n {t1, ... , tJ+1} = 0, i.e., support(m}+1) ~ s:. 
Also tJ+l R m'J+1 and te R m~ for all £ E [1..j] imply by the regularity of 
R that ti+1 R m}+i · Hence s~ (which equals tk) is R-dominated by the mixed 
strategy m~ E Mf. D 
The second condition of the regularity notion appears in Lemma 1 of Rob-
les [2003] under the name 'transitivity'. In that paper order independence 
of conditional dominance is established, a notion introduced in Shimoji and 
Watson [1998]. Establishing 'transitivity' for a specialized form of conditional 
dominance (called a robust demi-replacement) turns out to be a crucial step in 
the proof of the order independence. In our case regularity allows us to focus 
our representation on the second reduction relation, ::::? R· 
In analogy to the case of dominance relations we say that a mixed dom-
inance relation R is hereditary if for every game G, its restriction G', a 
strategy Si of G' and a mixed strategy m~ of G' 
si is R-dominated by m~ in G implies s,i is R-dominated by m~ in G'. 
Also, as in the case of the dominance relations, given a mixed dominance 
relation R we can specialize the reduction relation ::::? R to =?1,R in which a 
single strategy is removed. The following counterpart of the One-at-a-time 
Elimination Theorem 3.2 then holds. 
Theorem 5.2 (One-at-a-time Elimination) For a mixed dominance rela-
tion R that is hereditary the => R satisfies the one-at-a-time property. 
Proof. Analogous to the proof of the One-at-a-time Elimination Theorem 3.2 
and left to the reader. D 
As in Section 3 for a mixed dominance relation R that is hereditary and 
regular we have three ways of proving that the reduction relation => R is UN. 
Here, for a change, we provide a proof for the first approach. 
Lemma 5.3 (One Step Closedness) For a mixed dominance relation R that 
is hereditary and regular the => R relation is one step closed. 
Proof. Given a game G := (S1, ... ,Sn,P1, ... ,pn), let G" := (S~, ... ,S~, 
p1 , •.. ,pn) be the game obtained from G by removing all the strategies that are 
R-dominated by a mixed strategy in G. Then G _, .R G", so by the Equivalence 
Lennna 5 .1 G => R. G". 
Suppose now that G => R G' for some G' := (S~, .. . , S~, P1, .. . , Pn)- Then 
clearly S:' ~ S~ for all i E [Ln]. If G' and G" coincide, then G' =>AG". 
Otherwise fix i E [Ln] and consider a strategy Si such that Si E s~ \ sr 
So si is eliminated in the step G => R G". Hence si is R-dominated in G by a 
mixed strategy m~ E M:'. By the hereditarity of R si is R-dominated in G' 
by m~. This proves G' =? R G". D 
The reader may note a 'detour' in this proof through the _, reduction, 
justified by the Equivalence Lemma 5.1. The above lemma brings us to the 
following conclusion. 
Theorem 5.4 (Mixed Elimination) For a mixed dominance relation R that 
is hereditary and regular the => R relation is UN. 
Proof. We noted already in Section 2 that one step closedness implies weak 
confluence. So Newman's Lemma 2.1 applies. D 
In other words, when R is a mixed dominance relation that is heredi-
tary and regular, the process of iterated elimination of R-dominated strategics 
yields a unique outcome. 
We can directly apply the results of this section to strict dominance by 
mixed strategies. Let us recall first the definition. Consider a game (S1, ... , Sn, 
p1 , ... ,pn)· We say that a strategy Si is strictly dominated by a mixed 
strategy m~, or equivalently, that a mixed strategy m~ strictly dominates a 
strategy si, if 
for all Li E S-i· 
This mixed dominance relation entails the reduction relation ="1-sM on 
games obtained by instantiating the mixed dominance relation R in ='?-R by 
the strict dominance in the above sense. Clearly, strict dominance by a mixed 
strategy is hereditary and regular, so by virtue of the above results we get the 
following counterpart of the Strict Elimination Theorem 3.5. 
Theorem 5.5 (Strict Mixed Elimination) 
{i) The ="1-sM relation is UN. 
{ii) The ="1-sM relation satisfies the one-at-a-time property. D 
The first item states that strict dominance by means of mixed strategics is 
order independent. 
6 Mixed Strategies: Inherent Dominance 
The concepts and results of Section 4 can be naturally modified to the case of 
mixed dominance relations. Consider such a relation Rand a game (S1, .. ., Sn, 
pi, .. ., Pn) and let fj_i be a non-empty subset of S-i· We say that a strategy 
Si is R-dominated given [;_i by a mixed strategy m~ if si is R-dominated by 
m~ in the game (Si, s_i,Pl, .. .,pn) and say that a strategy Si is inherently 
R-dominated if for every non-empty subset S_i of S_i it is R-dominated 
given s_i by some mixed strategy m~. 
As before, each mixed dominance relation R entails two reduction relations 
-+inh-R and ="1-inh-R on games and their 'one-at-a-time' versions, -+1,inh-R 
and ="1-1,R· 
The individual independence of irrelevant alternatives condition 
(IIIA) now holds for a mixed dominance relation R if for every game (Si, S_i, 
P1,--.,Pn) 
for all i E [l..n], all non-empty S~ ~Si, si E s: and mi E Mf 
Si Rm~ holds in (Si, s_i,P1, .. .,pn) iff it holds in (S~, s_i,PI, .. .,Pn)· 
By analogy we obtain the following results concerning the introduced re-
duction relations. 
Lemma 6.1 (Equivalence) For a mixed dominance relation R that is regu-
lar the relations -+inh-R and =?inh-R coincide. 
Proof. Analogous to the proof of the Equivalence Lemma 5.1 and omitted. D 
Lemma 6.2 (One Step Closedness) For a mixed dominance relation R that 
satisfies the IIIA condition and is regular the =?inh-R relation is one step 
closed. 
Proof. Analogous to the proof of the One Step Closcdness Lemma 5.3, using 
the Equivalence Lemma 6.1, and omitted. D 
Theorem 6.3 (Inherent Mixed Elimination) For a mixed dominance re-
lation R that satisfies the IIIA condition and is regular the =? inh-R relation 
is~ D 
Proof. By the One Step Closedness Lemma 6.2 and Newman's Lemma 2.1. 
D 
Theorem 6.4 (One-at-a-time Elimination) For a mixed dominance rela-
tion R that satisfies the IIIA condition the =?inh-R relation satisfies the one-
at-a-time property. 
Proof. Analogous to the proof of the One-at-a-time Elimination Theorem 3.2 
and omitted. D 
These results can be directly applied to weak dominance by a mixed strat-
egy. Recall that given a game (S1, ... , Sn,P1, ... ,pn) we say that a strategy Si 
is weakly dominated by a mixed strategy m~, and write Si WM m~, if 
for all B-i E S_i, with some discquality being strict. 
It is straightforward to check that WM satisfies the IIIA condition and is 
regular. However, somewhat unexpectedly, we do not get now any new results, 
since as shown by Borgers [1990] the reduction relations -+inh-WM and -+sM 
(and hence =?inh-WM and =?sM) coincide. 
7 More on Abstract Reduction Systems 
We shall soon deal with the elimination of payoff equivalent strategies and to 
this end we shall need a refinement of Newman's Lemma 2.1. Consider an 
abstract reduction system (A, -+ ) and assume an equivalence relation ,..._, on 
A. We now relativize the previously introduced notions to ,....., and introduce 
one new concept linking -+ and ,....., . 
• If every element of A has a unique up to ,.._, normal form, we say that 
(A, -+) (or simply -+) satisfies the rv-unique normal form prop-
erty. 
• We say that -+ is rv-weakly confluent if for all a, b, c E A 
a 
/ "'" b c 
implies that for some di, dz E A 
b c 
• We say that -+ is rv-bisimilar if for all a, b, c E A 
a rv b 
1 
c 
implies that for some d E A 
The following lemma is then a relativized version of Newman's Lemma 
2.1. It is a special case of Lemma 2.7 from Huet [1980, page 803], with a more 
direct proof. 
Lemma 7.1 ( rv-Newman) Consider an abstract reduction system (A, ---+) 
and an equivalence relation rv on A such that 
• no infinite ---+ sequences exist, 
• --7 is rv-weakly confluent, 
• --7 is rv-bisimilar. 
Then ---+ satisfies the "'-unique normal form property. 
Proof. We modify the proof of Newman's Lemma 2.1. We call now an element 
a ambiguous if it has at least two normal forms that are not equivalent w.r.t. "'· 
As before we show that for every ambiguous a some ambiguous b exists such 
that a --7 b. This proves absence of ambiguous elements by the first assumption. 
So suppose that some element a has two distinct normal forms ni and n2 
such that n 1 rf n2 . Then for some b, c we have a --7 b--7* ni and a --7 c --7* n2. 
By the "'-weak confluence some di and d2 exist such that b--7* d1, c ---+* d2 and 
di ,.._, d2. Let n3 be a normal form of di. Then it is a normal form of b, as well. 
By the repeated use of the "'-bisimilarity of ---+ 
implies that for some n4 E A 
Since n 3 is a normal form, by the ,.._,-bisimilarity of ---+ so is n4• So n4 is 
a normal form of c. Moreover n3 rf n1 or n3 rf n 2 , since otherwise n1 ,.._, n2 
would hold. If n3 rf ni, then b is ambiguous and a---+ b. And if n 3 rf n2 , then 
also n4 rf n2 and then c is ambiguous and a ---+ c. D 
Also, we have the following relativized version of the Unique Normal Form 
Note 2.2. 
Note 7.2 ( rv-Unique Normal Form) Consider two abstract reduction sys-
tems (A, ---+1 ) and (A, ---+2 ) and an equivalence relation,.._, on A such that 
• -+1 satisfies the '""-unique normal form property, 
• ~+ - i+ ~1 - ~2. 
Then -+2 satisfies the '"'-'-unique normal form property. D 
We shall also study the combined effect of two forms of elimination. In 
what follows we abbreviate -+i U -+2 to -+1v2. (The use of U instead of 
V would clash with the notation used in Section 10.) Given two abstract 
reduction systems (A, _,1 ) and (A, _,2) we say that _,i left commutes 
with -+2 if 
-+1 0 _,2 ~ _,2 0 -+~ , 
i.e., if for all a, b, c E A a -+1 b _,2 c implies that for some d E A a -+2 d -+i c. 
Note 1.3 (Left Commutativity) If _,1 left commutes with 
does -+t. 
Then we shall rely on the following result. 
Lemma 7.4 (Normal Form) Consider two abstract reduction systems 
(A, _, 1 ) and (A, -+2 ) and an equivalence relation'"" on A such that 
• (A, _,iv2 ) satisfies the "'-unique normal form property, 
• -+1 left commutes with _,2 . 
Then for all a EA, if 
a 
*/2 2"-,,* 
b c 
for some -+2 -normal forms b and c, then for some -*iv2 -normal forms di, d2 E 
A 
b c 
1"-,,* */1 
di"" d2. 
Proof. Suppose that a _,2b and a -+2c where band care _,2-normal forms. 
By the first assumption for some -+1 v2 -normal forms d1 , d2 E A we have 
b -+iv2d1, c _,iv2d2 and di '""d2. 
If for some ei, e2 E A we have b _,t ei -+2e2 _,i v2di, then by the second 
assumption and the Left Commutativity Note 7.3 for some e3 E A we have 
b-+2e3 -+ie2, which contradicts the choice of b. So in the path b -+iv2d1 there 
are no -+2 transitions. By the same argument also in the path c _,iv2d2 there 
are no -+2 transitions. D 
8 Pure Strategies: Payoff Equivalence 
We now move on to a study of the elimination of payoff equivalent strategies. 
This binary relation on the strategies, PE, entails the corresponding reduction 
relation =>PE on the games. Let us recall the definition. Given a game 
G := (S1, .. . , Sn,P1, ... ,pn) and its restriction G' := (S~, .. . , S~,p1 , ... ,pn) 
• G =>PEG' iff G i= G' and for all i E [l..n] 
each si E Si \ S~ is pa yo ff equivalent in G to some s~ E Si. 
Note that =>PE is not weakly confluent and it does not satisfy the unique 
normal form property. Indeed, given two payoff equivalent strategies r and 
s, the removal of r and the removal of s yields two different games. But 
these games are obviously equivalent in the sense that a renaming of their 
strategies makes them identical. To study the effect of the removal of the 
payoff equivalent strategies we shall therefore consider the following equiv-
alence relation "" between two games, G := (S1 , •. . , Sn, Pi. ... ,pn) and 
G' ·- (S' S' p' p' )· 
. 1, ... , n' 1, ... , n · 
G' ""G" iff for all i E [Ln] there exists a 1-1 and onto mapping fi : Si -t S~ 
such that for all i E [Ln] and Si E Si, Pi(s1, ... ,sn) = p~(f1(s1), ... ,fn(sn)). 
In what follows we shall consider various (also mixed) reduction relations 
=> R on games in presence of the ,...., equivalence relation on the games. In each 
case it will be straightforward to see that => R is "'-'-bisimilar. Intuitively, the 
rv-bisimilarity of =>R simply means that R does not depend on the strategy 
names. 
Note that if a (mixed) reduction relation R is hereditary, then to prove 
that => R is rv-bisimilar it is sufficient on the account of the One-at-a-time 
Elimination Theorems 3.2 and 5.2 to check that =>1,R is .....,-bisimilar. 
Instead of saying that a reduction relation => R on the set of all restrictions 
of a game H satisfie.s the rv-unique normal form property, we shall simply say 
that =>R is rv-UN. 
To reason about the =>PE reduction relation we shall focus on the rela-
tion =>i,PE concerned with the removal of a single strategy payoff equivalent 
strategy. The following simple observation holds. 
Lemma 8.1 (Weak Confluence) Consider a game H. The =>i,PE relation 
on the set of all restrictions of a game H is "'-weakly confluent. 
Proof. Suppose G =*i,PE G' and G =*i,PE G". Let r and s be the strategies 
eliminated in the first, respectively second, transition. If r and s are pay-
off equivalent in G, then G' ,._, G". Otherwise, by the hereditarity of PE, 
G' '* G' n G" and G" '* G' n G". o l,PE l,PE 
This brings us to the following result that we shall need in the sequel. 
Theorem 8.2 (Payoff Equivalence Elimination) 
{i} The =*i,PE relation is ,__,_UN. 
{ii} The :::;>PE relation is ,.._,-UN. 
Proof. 
(i) We just proved that =*i,PE is ""-weakly confluent. Also, this reduction 
relation is clearly ""-bisimilar. So the conclusion follows by the ,...,,-Newman's 
Lemma 7.1. 
(ii) First note that PE is hereditary, so by the One-at-a-time Elimination 
Theorem 3.2 =*PE satisfies the one-at-a-time property, that is, 
:::;>+ - :::;>+ l,PE - PE· 
It suffices now to apply the ""-Unique Normal Form Note 7.2. 0 
Informally, the process of iterated elimination of payoff equivalent strate-
gies yields a unique outcome up to the introduced equivalence relation "" on 
the games. This outcome can also be achieved in one step, by replacing each 
maximal set of at least two mutually payoff equivalent strategies by one rep-
resentative. The resulting game is called in Myerson [1991] a purely reduced 
game. Of course, the above result is completely expected. Still, we find that 
a concise formal justification of it is in order. 
9 Mixed Strategies: Randomized Redundance 
The notion of payoff equivalent strategies generalizes in the obvious way to 
the mixed strategies. We denote by PEM the corresponding mixed dominance 
relation. So for a strategy si and a mixed strategy m~ of player i si PEM m~ 
if 
Pi(si, s_i) = Pi(m~, s_i) 
for all j E [Ln] and all s_i E S-i· 
As explained in Sr•ction 5 PEM entails the reduction relation => N:M on 
games. Recall that a strategy s; of player i is called randomized redundant 
to a mixed strateg_y m, if it is payoff equivalent to m, and s; £1 support(rni). 
Note that for a game (Si. ... , s .. , p1, ..• , p .. ) and its restriction G' := (S~, .. . , S~, 
Pi. ... , Pn) we have 
• G => PEM G' when G f. G' and for all i E [l..11] 
each s: E S; \ s: is randomized redundant in G to some m: E MI. 
As in the case of payoff equivdlence it is more convenient to focus on the re-
moval of a single strategy, so on the reduction relation =>i,PEM. The following 
counterpart of the Weak Conflm'ncc Lemma 8.1 hol<ls. 
Lemma 9.1 (Weak Confluence) Consider a game H. The =>t,PEM rela-
tion on the set of all restriction .. i; of a game H is "'-weakly confluent. 
Proof. Suppose G =>1.PEM G' and G =>i,PEM G". Let rand t be the strategics 
eliminated in the first, respectively second, transition. If r and t are payoff 
equivalent, then, as in the proof of the Weak Confluence Lemma 8.1, G' "'G". 
Otherwise for some o E [O, 1) and /3 E [O, 1) r is payoff equivalent to a mixed 
strategy o t + (1 - o)m1 with r, t rt support(m1) and t is payoff equivalent 
to a mixed strategy r1 r + (1 - /3)m2 with r, t f/. support(m2 ). Sor is payoff 
equivalent too: /3 r + o(l - /3)m2 + (1 - o:)mi, and hence to 
m' := (a(l - J}m2 + (1 - G)m1)/(l - a /3). 
Since t f/. support(m'), m' is a mixed strategy in G". So by the hercditarity 
of PEM r is payoff Pquivalrnt t.o m' in G". Further, since r, t ~ support(m'), 
m' is a mixed strategy in G' n G". So we showL'<:i that G" =>i,PEM G' n G". By 
symmetry G' =>1,PEM G' n G". 0 
As in the case of the ~PE relation we can now conclude. 
Theorem 9.2 (Redundance Elimination) 
(i} The =>1.PEM relation is rv-UN. 
(ii) The =>PEM 1-elation is rv-UN. 0 
So the process of iterated elimination of randomized redundant strategics 
yields a unique up to ,..., outcome. The result is called in Myerson [1991 J a 
fully reduced game. 
10 Combining Two Dominance Relations 
Given two dominance relation R, Q we now consider the combined dominance 
relation R U Q. Such a combination is meaningful to study when Q is such 
that the =>-Q reduction relation is rv-UN. An example is the payoff equivalence 
PE relation discussed in Section 8. 
Given two dominance relations R and Q we would like now to identify 
conditions that allow us to conclude that the ==>-RuQ reduction relation is "-'-
UN. To this end we introduce the following concept. We say that R is closed 
under Q if in all games G for all strategies r, s, t 
• r R s and s Q t implies r R t, 
• r Q s and s R t implies r R t, 
i.e., if in all games Ro Q ~ R and Q o R ~ R. 
Here is a result that we shall use in the sequel. 
Theorem 10.1 (Combination) Consider two dominance relations Rand Q 
such that 
• ==? R and =?Q are rv-bisimilar, 
• R is a strict partial order, 
• R is closed under Q, 
• =>-1,Q is rv-UN, 
• R U Q is hereditary. 
Then the ==>- RUQ relation is rv- UN. 
Notice that we do not insist here that R is hereditary. In fact, in one of 
the uses of the above result the dominance relation R will not be hereditary. 
Proof. Since RU Q is hereditary, by the One-at-a-time Elimination Theorem 
3.2 and the "-'-Unique Normal Form Note 7.2 it suffices to prove that =>- 1,nuQ is 
rv-UN. But by assumption both =>- 1,R and =>- 1,Q are "'-bisimilar, so =>- 1,nuQ 
is "'-bisimilar, as well. So on the account of the "'-Newman's Lemma 7.1 
the fact that ==>- 1,RuQ is "'-UN is established once we show that ==>- l,RuQ is 
"'-weakly confluent. 
So suppose that G ==>- 1,nuQG' and G ::::} 1,RuQG". Let r and s be the strate-
gies eliminated in the first, respectively second, transition. By the fourth 
assumption ~ l,Q is is "'-weakly confluent, so we only need to consider a 
situation when G ~1,RG'. 
We can assume that G' =!= G". Then r is in G" and s is in G'. By definition 
r R t holds in G for some strategy t of G' and s R U Q u holds in G for some 
strategy u of G". To show that G" ~ l,RuQG' n G" we consider two cases. 
Case 1. t is in G", i.e., s =!= t. 
Then, by the hereditarity of RU Q, r RU Qt holds in G". 
Case 2. t is not in G", i.e., s = t. 
Then r R s holds in G. Ifs Ru holds in G, then, by the transitivity of R 
also r Ru holds in G. 
If s Q u holds in G, then by the fact that R is closed under Q r R u holds 
in G, as well. Further, r =!= u by the irreflexivity of R, sou is in G'. Hence, by 
Case 1, r RU Q u holds in G". 
This proves that G" ~ i,RUQG' n G". To show that G' ~ i,RUQG' n G" we 
again consider two cases. 
Case 1. u is in G', i.e., u =/= r. 
Then, by the hereditarity of RU Q, s RU Q u holds in G'. Also u is in G". 
Case 2. u is not in G', i.e., u = r. 
Then s RU Qr holds in G. Ifs R r holds in G, then, by the transitivity 
of R, s R t holds in G. 
If s Q r holds in G, then by the fact that R is closed under Q s R t holds in 
G, as well. But s and t are strategies of G', so by the hereditarity of R s Rt 
holds in G'. This shows G' ~ R G' n G". 
By the Equivalence Lemma 3.1 the relations ~R and ~R coincide, so 
some strategy t' of G' n G" exists such that s R t', and a fortiori s R U Q t', 
holds in G'. 
This proves that G' ~ i,RUQG' n G". D 
This result is a generalization of the Elimination Theorem 3.4. Indeed, it 
suffices to use instead of "'"' the identity relation on games, and use as Q the 
identity dominance relation (according to which a strategy is only dominated 
by itself). Then the assumptions of the above theorem reduce to those of the 
Elimination Theorem 3.4. 
As a simple application of this result consider the combination of the strict 
dominance and the payoff equivalence. The strict dominance relation is hered-
itary and so is PE, and a union of two hereditary dominance relations is hered-
itary. Further, strict dominance is a strict partial order and is easily seen to 
be closed under the payoff equivalence. So the following direct consequence 
of the Payoff Equivalence Elimination Theorem 8.2(i) and of the above result 
holds. 
Theorem 10.2 (Combined Strict Elimination) The ===>-suPE relation is 
rv-UN. D 
In other words, the combined iterated elimination of strategies in which 
at each step we remove some strictly dominated strategies and some payoff 
equivalent strategies yields a unique up to the equivalence relation ,....., outcome. 
11 Combining Nice Weak Dominance with 
Payoff Equivalence 
In this section we show another application of the Combination Theorem 10.1 
concerned with a modification of the weak dominance. We denote by ===>-w the 
reduction relation on games corresponding to weak dominance. As mentioned 
earlier, ===>-w does not satisfy the unique normal form property. An example 
relevant for us will be provided in a moment. 
We studied already one modification of weak dominance in Section 4 by 
considering inherent weak dominance, a notion due to Borgers [1990]. An-
other approach was pursued in Marx and Swinkels [1997] (see also Marx and 
Swinkels [2000]) who studied the notion of nice weak dominance, introduced 
in Subsection 1.1 and denoted by NW. However, the -===>- NW reduction relation, 
just as ===>-w, does not satisfy the unique normal form property. To see this 
consider the following game: 
L R 
T 2,1 2,1 
B 2,1 1,0 
Clearly, all pairs of strategies are compatible, so weak dominance and nice 
weak dominance coincide here. This game can be reduced by means of the 
-===>- NW relation both to 
L R 
T I 2, 1 2, 1 
and to 
In each case we reached a *Nw-normal form. So the *Nw relation (and 
consequently the *w relation) is not weakly confluent and does not satisfy the 
unique normal form property. Note also that the strategy L (nicely) weakly 
dominates R. in the original game but not in the first first restriction. This 
shows that neither weak dominance nor nice weak dominance is hereditary. 
A solution consists of combining nice weak dominance with the payoff 
equivalence and seeking conditions under which nice weak dominance and weak 
dominance coincide. This is the approach taken in Marx and Swinkels [1997] 
who proved that the * Nw-normal forms of a game are the same up to the 
removal of the payoff equivalent strategies and a renaming of strategies. 3 They 
also observed that for the games (51 , ... , Sn,p1 , ..• ,pn) that satisfy the already 
mentioned in the Introduction transference of decisionmaker indiffer-
ence (TDI) condition: 
for all i, j E [L.n], s~, s7 E Si and B-i E S_i 
Pi(s~, s_i) = Pi(s?, s_i) implies Pi(s~, s_i) = Pi(s?, s_i), (1) 
nice weak dominance and weak dominance coincide on all restrictions. To see 
the latter note that the compatibility is hereditary and the TDI condition sim-
ply amounts to a statement that all pairs of strategies s~ and sr are compatible. 
So for the games that satisfy the TDI condition the * w-normal forms of a 
game are the same up to the removal of the payoff equivalent strategies and a 
renaming of strategies. 
Marx and Swinkels [1997] also provided a number of natural examples of 
games that satisfy this condition. We now present conceptually simpler proofs 
of their results by following the methodology used throughout the paper. In 
Section 13 we shall deal with the case of the nice weak dominance by mixed 
strategies. 
The following lemma summarizes the crucial properties of nice weak dom-
inance. They are 'crucial' in the sense that they allow us to directly apply 
the already discussed Combination Theorem 10.1 to nice weak dominance and 
payoff equivalence. 
Lemma 11.1 (Nice Weak Dominance) 
(i} NW is a strict partial order. 
3 Also an addition of payoff equivalent strategies is allowed. Our proof shows this is not 
needed. 
(ii) NW is closed under PE. 
(iii) NW U PE is hereditary. 
Proof. (i) First, note that the relation NW is clearly irreflexive. To prove 
transitivity consider a game (S1, ... , Sn,Pii .. . , Pn) and suppose that s7 NW s~ 
and s~ NW s;. 
Then clearly s? is weakly dominated by si. To prove that s7 and si are 
compatible suppose that for some s_i E S_i 
Then by the weak dominance 
Hence by the compatibility of s7 and s~ and the compatibility of s~ and si for 
all j E [l..n] 
Pi(s~, B-i) = Pi(s~, B-i) = Pi(s;, 8-i)· 
(ii) The proofs of the relevant two properties of NW are analogous to the 
proof of ( i) and are omitted. 
(iii) Let G' := (S~, .. . , S~,p1 , •. . , Pn) be a restriction of G := (S1, ... , Sn, pi, ... ,pn)· 
Suppose s~, sf E S~ arc such that s~ NW U PE s7 in G. Then s? and s~ are 
compatible in G and hence in G'. Moreover 
then s? weakly dominates s~ in G' and consequently s? nicely weakly dominates 
s~ in G'. Otherwise 
Pi(s~', s*_i) = Pi(s~, s*_i) 
for all s*_i E S'_i, so, by the compatibility of s? and s~ in G', 
payoff equivalent in G'. 
So we showed that s7 NW U PE s~ in G'. 
s~' and s~ are i i 
0 
Nice weak dominance clearly satisfies the IIIA condition of Section 4 and 
by item (i) above it is a strict partial order. So using R := NWin the Inherent 
Elimination Theorem 4.4 and the One-at-a-time Elimination Theorem 4.5 we 
get the following result. 
Theorem 11.2 (Inherent Nice Weak Elimination) 
(i) The =}inh-NW relation is UN. 
(ii) The =}inh-NW relation satisfies the one-at-a-time property. 0 
Further, the above lemma in conjunction with the Payoff Equivalence Elim-
ination Theorem 8.2(i) means that for R := NW and Q :=PE all assumptions 
of the Combination Theorem 10.1 are satisfied. So we get the following con-
clusion. 
Theorem 11.3 (Nice Weak Elimination) The =}NwuPE relation is ""-UN. 
0 
Also, for games that satisfy the TDI condition (1) the =}NWuPE and 
=} wuPE relations coincide on all restrictions, so the following conclusion fol-
lows. 
Corollary 11.4 (Weak Elimination) Consider a game H that satisfies the 
TD! condition (1). Then the =}wuPE relation is "'-UN. D 
To establish another form of order independence involving nice weak dom-
inance we shall rely on the following observation that refers to the crucial 
concept of left commutativity. 
Note 11.5 (Left Commutativity) =*PE left commutes with =}NW· 
Proof. By the One-at-a-time Elimination Theorem 3.2 the reduction relation 
=}PE satisfies the one-at-a-time property, i.e., 
So by the Left Commutativity Note 7.3 it suffices to show that =}l,PE left 
commutes with =*'NW· Suppose G =*'l,PE G' =}NwG". In the proof below we 
repeatedly use the fact that if a strategy ri is nicely weakly dominated in G' 
by a strategy tii then so it is in G. 
Let Si be the strategy deleted in the first transition. If all strategies that 
are payoff equivalent to Si are removed in the second transition, then by the 
Nice Weak Dominance Lemma 11.1 (ii) NW is closed under PE which implies 
G =*'NwG". Consequently G =*'Nw G" =*'1 PEG". 
Otherwise, by the fact that payoff eq~ivalence is hereditary, we have 
G =} NW G1 =*'l,PEG", where G1 is obtained. from G" by adding si to the set of 
strategies of player i. D 
As an aside, note that the same proof shows that =?-PE left commutes with 
=?- w and with =?-s. The relevant property is that both W and S are closed 
under PE. 
We reached now the already mentioned result of Marx and Swinkels [1997]. 
Theorem 11.6 (Structured Nice Weak Elimination) Suppose that 
G =?-'Nw G' and G =?-'Nw G", where both G' and G" are closed under the =?- NW 
reduction (i.e., are =?-Nw-normal forms). 
Then for some "'-equivalent games H' and H" closed under the =?- NWuPE 
reduction we have G' =?-'PE H' and G" =?- pe H". 
Proof. Since PE is hereditary, each step H1 =?- NWuPE H2 can be rewritten as 
H 1 =?-Nw H3 =?-pE H 2 for some game H3. So by the Nice Weak Elimination 
Theorem 11.3 the -+1v2 relation, where -+1 := =?-Nw and -+2 := =?-pE, is 
"'-UN. 
It suffices now to use the Left Commutativity Note 11.5 and the Normal 
Form Lemma 7.4. D 
As explained at the end of Section 8 the reductions from G' to H' and from 
G" to H" can be achieved in just one step. 
Corollary 11. 7 (Structured Weak Elimination) Consider a game G that 
satisfies the TD! condition (1). Suppose that G =?-w G' and G =?-w G", where 
both G' and G" are closed under the =?-w reduction. 
Then for some "'-equivalent games H' and H" we have G' =?-'PE H' and 
G" =?-PE H". D 
Recently, 0sterdal [2004] provided an alternative proof of this corollary. 
In the Weak Elimination Corollary 11.4 we can weaken the assumption that 
the initial game H satisfies the TDI condition. Indeed, it suffices to ensure that 
each time an =?- w reduction can take place, it is in fact an =?- NW reduction. 
This is guaranteed if the following condition TDI+ is satisfied, given an initial 
game H: 
for all restrictions G := (S1, ... , Sn,P1, ... ,pn) of H, 
for all i E [Ln] and ri, ti E S; 
if ti weakly dominates ri in G, then ri and ti are compatible in G. 
An alternative, suggested by Marx and Swinkels [1997] in the context of 
nice weak dominance by mixed strategies, is to use the following condition 
TDI++, where, given a game (S1, ... , Sn, Pi, .. . ,pn), a strategy s~ very weakly 
dominates a strategy s~ if 
Pi(s~, s_i) "?. Pi(s~, s_i) 
for all restrictions G := (S1, ... , Sn, Pb ... ,pn) of H, 
for all i E [l..n] and ri, ti E Si if ti very weakly dominates ri in G, then 
either ti weakly dominates ri in Gorri and ti are payoff equivalent in G. 
Indeed, it suffices to show that under the TDJ++ condition all assumptions 
of the Combination Theorem 10.1 are satisfied by the weak dominance relation 
W. First, note that W is a strict partial order and is clearly closed under the 
payoff equivalence. 
Denote now the very weak dominance relation by VW. Note that 
• W ~ VW (i.e., weak dominance implies very weak dominance), 
• VW is hereditary. 
Additionally, by the TDI++ assumption, 
• VW ~Wu PE 
holds in all restrictions of the initial game H. 
This implies under the TDr++ assumption that WU PE is hereditary since 
PE is hereditary. By the Combination Theorem 10.1 we conclude then that 
the =? WuPE reduction relation is rv-UN. 
The same considerations apply to the Structured Weak Elimination Corol-
lary 11.7. However, to be able to use the TD1++ condition we need in addition 
to prove that =>PE left commutes with => w. The proof is the same as that 
of the Left Commutativity Note 11.5. 
12 Combining Two Mixed Dominance Rela-
tions 
We now return to the mixed dominance relations and study a combination 
R U Q of two such relations R and Q. In the applications Q will be the 
randomized redundance relation PEM studied in Section 9. 
We say that a combined mixed dominance relation R is closed under Q 
if in all games G for all strategies r, s and all mixed strategies m 1, m2 
• r R m1 and s Q m2 implies r R mi[s/m2], 
• r Q m1 and s R m2 implies r R mi[s/m2]. 
The following counterpart of the Combination Theorem 10.1 holds. 
Theorem 12.1 (Combination) Consider two mixed dominance relations R 
and Q such that 
• => R and =>Q are "'-bisimilar, 
• R is regular, 
• R is closed under the randomized redundance, 
• => 1,Q is "'-UN, 
• R U Q is hereditary. 
Then the => RUQ relation is rv-UN. 
Proof. We proceed as in the proof of the Combination Theorem 10.1. 
Since RU Q is hereditary, by the One-at-a-time Elimination Theorem 3.2 
and the "-'-Unique Normal Form Note 7.2 it suffices to prove that => 1,RuQ 
satisfies the rv-unique normal form. In turn, by the rv-Newman's Lemma 7.1 
this is established once we show that => I,RuQ is "-'-weakly confluent. Indeed, 
as before => l,RuQ is "-'-bisimilar. 
So suppose that G => I,RUQG' and G => l,RUQG". Let r and s be the strate-
gies eliminated in the first, respectively second, transition. By the fourth as-
sumption => I,Q is rv-weakly confluent, so we only need to consider a situation 
when G =>1,R G'. 
We can assume that G' =f. G". Then r is in G" and sis in G'. By definition 
r R m 1 holds in G for some mixed strategy m1 of G' and s R U Q m2 holds 
in G for some mixed strategy m2 of G". To show that G" => I,RuQG' n G" we 
consider two cases. 
Case 1. s </. support(m1 ). 
Then m1 is a mixed strategy G", so r RU Q m 1 holds in G" by the hered-
itarity of RU Q. 
Case 2. s E support(m1). 
Ifs R m2 holds in G, then, by the regularity of R, r R m1[s/m2] holds in 
G. 
If sQ rn2 holds in G, then by the fact that R is closed under Q r R mi [s/m2] 
holds in G, as well. By assumption m 2 is a mixed strategy of G", so s r/. 
support(m2) and consequently s r/. support(mi[s/m2]). So by the first clause 
of the regularity condition for some mixed strategy m3 with r, s r/. support(m3) 
we haver R m3. Hence, by Case 1, r RU Q mi holds in G". 
This proves that G" =? i,RuQG' n G". To show that G' =? 1,RuQG' n G" we 
again consider two cases. 
Case 1. r r/. support(m2). 
Then m2 is a mixed strategy G', so s R U Q m2 holds in G' by the hcredi-
tarity of RU Q. 
Case 2. r E support(m2). 
Recall that s R U Q m 2 holds in G. If s R rn2 holds in G, then, by the 
regularity of R, s R m2 [r/m1] holds in G. Ifs Q m 2 holds in G, then by 
the fact that R is closed under Q s R m2[r /m1] holds in G, as well. By 
assumption m 1 is a mixed strategy of G', so r rJ. support( mi) and consequently 
r r/. support(m2[r /m1]). So m2 [r /m1] is a mixed strategy of G'. This shows 
G' --+R G' n G". 
By the Equivalence Lemma 5.1 the relations -+R and '*R coincide, so 
some mixed strategy m3 of G' n G" exists such that s R m 3 and a fortiori 
s RU Q m3 , holds in G'. 
This proves that G' =? i,RuQG' n G". 0 
This result can be directly applied to the combination of the elimination 
by strict dominance by mixed strategies and by the randomized redundancc. 
Indeed, we already noticed that both mixed dominance relations are heredi-
tary, so their union is, as well. Also, we already saw that strict dominance by 
means of mixed strategics is regular and it is easy to sec it is closed under the 
randomized redundance. So by the Redundance Elimination Theorem 9.2( i) 
and the above result we can draw the following conclusions. 
Theorem 12.2 (Combined Mixed Strict Elimination) The '*sMuPDM 
relation is "'-UN. D 
13 Combining Nice Weak Dominance with 
Randomized Redundance 
Finally, we provide a proof of another result of Marx and Swinkcls [1997] 
that deals with the nice weak dominance by mixed strategics. This concept 
is obtained by generalizing in the obvious way the definition of nice weak 
dominance to the case when the dominating strategy is mixed. 
Recall from Section 6 that given a game G we write s~ WM m~ when the 
strategy s~ is weakly dominated in G by the mixed strategy m~. We also write 
s~ NWM m~ when the strategy s~' is nicely weakly dominated in G by the 
mixed strategy m~, that is when sl WM m~ and s~' and m~ are compatible. 
As in Section 11 we summarize first the relevant properties of the nice weak 
mixed dominance relation. 
Lemma 13.1 (Nice Mixed Weak Dominance) 
(i) NWM is regular. 
(ii) NWM is closed under PEM. 
(iii) NWM U PEM is hereditary. 
Proof. Fix a game (S1, ... , Sn,P1, ... ,pn). 
( i) Suppose that for some a E (0, l] and some strategy s and a mixed strategy 
m of player i 
s NWM (1-a)s+am 
holds. By definition for all j E [1..n] and all s_i E S_i 
PJ((l - a)s +am, s_,i) = (1 - a)pJ(s, s_i) +a PJ(m, s_i), 
so for all op E { =, <, :S} 
pJ(s, s_i) op PJ((l - a)s +am, s_i) iff PJ(s, s_i) op PJ(m, s_.i). 
This implies s NWM m. 
Next, consider the strategies t1 and t2 and mixed strategies m1 and m2 
of player i. For some a E [O, l] and a mixed strategy m we have m 1 
a t2 + (1 - a)m. By definition for all j E [1..n] and all s_; E S_; 
(2) 
and 
PJ(mi[t2/m2], s_i) = o: PJ(m2 1 s_i) + (1 - a)pJ(m, s_;). (3) 
It is now easy to check that t1 WM m 1 and t2 WM m 2 implies t 1 WM mi[t2fm2]. 
Suppose now that t 1 WNM m1 and t2 WNM m 2. We prove that t 1 and 
mi[t2/m2] are compatible. So suppose that for some i E [l..n] and s_i E S_i 
Then by (2) and (3) and the fact that t 1 WM m 1 and t2 WM m2 
Pi(t1, s_i) = Pi(m1, S-i) and Pi(t2, s_i) = Pi(m2, s_i)· 
So by the compatibility of t 1 and m 1 and of t2 and m 2 for all j E [I..n] 
pj(t1, s_i) = Pi(m1, s_i) and Pj(t2, s_i) = Pi(m2, s_i), 
so again by (2) and (3) 
(ii) The proofs of the relevant two properties of NWM are analogous to the 
proof of ( i) and are omitted. 
(iii) Analogous to the proof of the Nice Weak Dominance Lemma 11.l(iii) 
and omitted. D 
We can now apply to nice weak mixed dominance the Inherent Mixed 
Elimination Theorem 6.3. This way we obtain the following result. 
Theorem 13.2 (Inherent Nice Weak Mixed Elimination) 
(i) The ==}inh-NWM relation is UN. 
(ii) The ==}inh-NWM relation satisfies the one-at-a-time property. D 
Further, on the account of the Redundancc Elimination Theorem 9.2(i) for 
R := NWM and Q :=FEM all assumptions of the Combination Theorem 12.1 
are satisfied. We can then draw the following conclusion. 
Theorem 13.3 (Nice Weak Mixed Elimination) The ==}NWMuPEM rela-
tion is ,....,_UN. D 
To draw a similar conclusion for the weak dominance by mixed strategies, 
as in Section 11 we provide three alternative conditions. The first one, TDIM, 
is the direct counterpart of the TDI condition (1): 
for all i, j E [1..n], r.i E Si, mi E Mi and s_i E S_i 
Pi(ri, s_i) =Pi( mi, s_i) implies Pj(ri, s_i) = Pj(mi, s_i) 
Equivalently, for all i E [I..n], ri E Si and mi E Mi, ri and mi arc compatible. 
Indeed, the compatibility as a mixed dominance relation is hereditary, so 
the TDIM condition implies that nice weak dominance and weak dominance, 
both by mixed strategics, coincide on all restrictions. 
The second one, TDIM+, is the counterpart of the TDI+ condition of Sec-
tion 11. Given an initial game H we postulate that 
for all restrictions G :=(Si, ... , Sn,P1, ... ,pn) of H, 
for all i E [Ln], ri E Si and mi E Mi 
if mi weakly dominates ri in G, then ri and mi are compatible in G. 
Then each time an =>WM reduction can take place, it is in fact an => NWM 
reduction. The last alternative, TDI*, was proposed in Marx and Swinkels 
[1997]. It refers to the notion of the very weak dominance introduced in 
Section 11, now used as a mixed dominance relation: 
for all restrictions G := (51, .. . , Sn,P1, ... ,pn) of H, 
for all i E [Ln], ri E Si and mi E Mi 
if mi very weakly dominates ri in G, then 
either mi weakly dominates ri in Gorri and mi are payoff equivalent in G. 
Then the following result holds. 
Theorem 13.4 (Weak Mixed Elimination) Consider a game H that sat-
isfies the TD!* condition. Then the => wMuPEM relation is ,..,_UN. 
Proof. We proceed as in Section 11. Denote the very weak mixed dominance 
relation by VW M. Note that 
• WM~VWM, 
• VW M is hereditary. 
Additionally, by the TDI* assumption, 
• VWM~WMUPEM 
holds in all restrictions of the initial game H. 
So under the TDI* assumption WM U PEM is hereditary since PEM is 
hereditary. By the Combination Theorem 12.1 we conclude that the => wMuPEM 
relation is "-'-UN. 
To establish another form of order independence involving nice mixed weak 
dominance we need the following observation. 
Note 13.5 (Left Commutativity) 
(i) => PEM left commutes with =9-NWM. 
(ii) *PEM left commutes with *wM· 
Proof. ( i) By the Nice Mixed Weak Dominance Lemma 13.1 (ii) NWM is 
closed under the randomized redundance. The rest of the proof is now analo-
gous to the proof of the Left Commutativity Note 11.5 and is omitted. 
(ii) By the same argument as in (i). D 
As in Section 11 we can now draw the following results due to Marx and 
Swinkels [1997]. 
Theorem 13.6 (Structured Nice Weak Mixed Elimination) Suppose 
that G * ivwM G' and G * NwM G", where both G' and G" are closed under the 
* NWM reduction. 
Then for some rv-equivalent games H' and H" closed under the :::} NWMuPEM 
reduction we have G' :::} PEM H' and G" * 'PEM H". D 
Corollary 13. 7 (Structured Weak Mixed Elimination) Consider a game 
G that satisfies the TD!* condition. Suppose that G *wM G' and G =}WM G", 
where both G' and G" are closed under the *wM reduction. 
Then for some rv-equivalent games H' and H" closed under the * wMuPEM 
reduction we have G' *PEM H' and G" *PEM H". D 
14 Conclusions 
In this paper we presented uniform proofs of order independence for various 
strategy elimination procedures. The main ingredients of our approach were 
reliance on Newman's Lemma and related results on the abstract reduction 
systems, and an analysis of the structural properties of the dominance rela-
tions. This exposition allowed us to clarify which structural properties account 
for the order independence of the entailed reduction relations on the games. 
In Figure 2 below we summarize the order independence results discussed 
in this article. We use here the already introduced abbreviations, so: 
S denotes strict dominance, 
W denotes weak dominance, 
NW denotes nice weak dominance, 
PE denotes payoff equivalence. 
Further, RM stands for the 'mixed strategy' version of the dominance relation 
R and inh-R stands for the 'inherent' version of the (mixed) dominance relation 
R discussed in Sections 4 and 6. 
Recall also that UN stands for the uniqueness of the normal form, i.e., for 
the order independence and ""-UN is its 'up to the game equivalence' version. 
All the results refer to the order independence of the => R reduction relation 
on games, introduced in Section 3. 
Dominance Property Proved Result originally due to 
Notion in Section 
s UN 3 Gilboa, Kalai and Zemel [1990], 
Stegeman [1990] 
inh-W UN 4 Borgers [1990] 
inh-NW UN 11 
SM UN 5 Osborne and Rubinstein [1994] 
inh-WM UN 6 (Borgers [1990]: equal to SM) 
inh-NWM UN 13 
PE ""-UN 8 
Su PE ""-UN 10 
NWUPE ""'-UN 11 Marx and Swinkels [1997] 
PEM ""'-UN 9 
SMUPEM ru-UN 12 
NWMUPEM ru-UN 13 Marx and Swinkels [1997] 
Figure 2: Summary of the order independence results 
The reduction relations on games that we studied are naturally related. 
For example we have =>s ~ =>sM, with the strict inclusion for some games. 
However, the respective results about these reduction relations are not related. 
For example, the fact that =>s is UN not a special case of the fact that =>sM 
is UN. 
Indeed, given two abstract reduction systems (A, -+1 ) and (A, -+2 ) such 
that -+1 ~ -+2 the uniqueness of a normal form with respect to -+2 docs not 
imply the uniqueness of a normal form with respect to -+1. Indeed, just take 
-+1 := {(a, b), (a, c)} and -+2 := -+1 U { (b, d), (c, d)}. This example also 
shows that weak confluence of -+2 does not imply weak confluence of -+1. 
So the weak confluence of =>sis not a consequence of the weak confluence of 
=>sM· The same remarks apply to other pairs of dominance relations. 
The provided proofs of the order independence results break down for in-
finite games. The reason is that the crucial assumption of Newman's Lemma, 
namely that that no infinite -+ sequences exist, does not hold then anymore. 
Moreover, for infinite games the Equivalence Lem.ma 3.1 does not hold. Still, 
it would be interesting to try to establish the main result of Dufwenberg and 
Stegeman [2002] using the abstract reduction systems techniques. 
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